To be effective, groups that disseminate information need trust. When different groups provide conflicting information on a new product or process like genetically modified (GM) foods, we hypothesize that consumers place different levels of trust in the sources and trust is related to their income, personal and social capital, and prior beliefs. A random sample of adults was asked to state their preferences for sources they would trust to provide verifiable (i.e., objective) information on genetic modification. Their responses were grouped into six categories, and a multinominal logit model used to explain relative trust in information sources.
1992). If, however, a new vitamin were introduced into a food crop using genetic modification, the food product would have to be labeled (FDA, 2001) . In contrast, the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Brazil have mandatory labeling policies for GM-foods.
Furthermore, in 1998 the European Union enacted a moratorium on approvals of genetically modified foods, which has not been lifted.
In principle, society can recapture some of the losses from diverse information disseminated by interested parties if decision makers have access to independent, third-party information. For example, see the discussion of verifiable information in Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Huffman and Tegene (2002) . In recent research, Huffman et al. (2003) have defined verifiable information for genetic modification as information that is from a knowledgeable independent, third-party source that has no significant financial ties to the agricultural biotechnology industry. Although government agencies provide information, we do not claim that federal government agencies present an independent, third-party perspective. Federal regulatory agencies do not have the resources required to engage in significant independent research, and they must rely heavily upon the firms that they regulate to provide them the information they use to make recommendations. Although biotech firms are not always pleased with decisions made by the FDA, USDA, or EPA, the international NGOs believe that these agencies have a decidedly pro-biotech perspective (Greenpeace 2000) . Also, elected government officials may receive campaign contributions from interested parties who are hoping to obtain future favorable treatment. Consequently, Huffman and Tegene (2002) have proposed that a quasi-governmental agency, that is funded, perhaps by the federal government, but not controlled by government officials, would be most credible source of independent, third-party information on genetic modification. Rousu et al. (2003) have concluded that verifiable information on genetically modified (GM) food products can have an annual value to U.S. consumers of over $2 billion annually.
Interested and disinterested parties disseminate information with the goal of affecting consumers' (and producers') decisions on GM-technology and other products. However, for these groups to be influential, they must garner "trust." Recent evidence by Glaeser et al. (2000) shows that individuals who are closer in social status or who have similar personal capital are more likely to trust one another. For example, individuals who were raised with a particular religious tradition place more trust in others who were raised within the same religious tradition, ceteris paribus. More generally, Becker (1996) argues that a consumer's social and personal capital are an important determinant of his or her tastes or preferences. Social capital is defined as the capital the individual acquires through his or her surroundings, upbringing, and social network. Personal capital is defined as capital that the individual personally acquires, such as schooling, habits, or experience. Becker shows when personal and social capital are incorporated into economic models, economic theory can explain many previously puzzling outcomes such as the effect of advertising on consumers' purchasing behavior and human addictions.
Understanding the formation of trust in information sources is an important step in understanding consumers' preferences for information on new products. With the aid of a model, we formulate hypotheses about the role of measurable attributes of a consumer, which are related to his or her household income, personal and social capital, and prior beliefs in the formation of trust. For this study, unique data were collected by an independent agency from a random sample of adults chosen from two major Midwestern cities. These people were paid $40 to come to a central location, to provide social-demographic information and information on prior beliefs about technologies, and to participate in a set of experiments (as explained in detail in a companion paper, Huffman et al. (2003) ). At the end of the experiments, they were asked to complete a short questionnaire including the following question: "If a source of information were to give you verifiable information on genetically modified foods, who would you trust most?" This information was coded into six different categories: third-party, government, environmental or consumer group, private industry or organization, none or nobody, and "other" (including no response). A multinomial logit model is fitted to the sample of post-experiment participants to explain their relative trust in sources to provide verifiable information on GMfoods.
We find an individual's household income has no significant effect on relative trust, but an increase in his or her schooling lowers the probability of trusting information from government, private industry or organizations, environmental or consumer groups, or "other" sources relative to information from an independent third-party source. Older individuals have significantly lower odds of trusting "nobody" for GM-information relative to an independent, third-party source. People who claimed to be informed about genetic modification before the experiments were more likely to trust the government than a third-party sources. People who had a conservative religious upbringing had a lower odds of trusting private industry or organizations and a higher odds of trusting "nobody" relative to an independent, third-party source. The paper has five sections.
Model
Following Becker (1996) , consider the strictly quasi-concave utility function shown as:
Utility is based on the consumption of two choice variables: foods labeled as genetically modified (X l ) and foods that have a plain label (X pl ). The utility of these two goods is hypothesized to be affected by information from j sources. This information differs in quality for each type (i.e., level of trust). Assume information quality or trust in the jth type is a function of the consumer's personal capital (PC) and social capital (SC):
The market price for foods labeled as genetically modified is p l and the price of plain-labeled foods is p pl . At time t, the consumer maximizes his or her utility, subject to the budget constraint M, and stock of personal and social capital:
The first-order conditions are as follows:
Equations 5 and 6 can be rearranged to show the marginal rate of substitution between genetically modified-labeled and plain-labeled foods, as shown in equation (7):
A consumer's marginal rate of substitution between genetically modified-labeled and plainlabeled food is a function of the relative prices of the goods and personal and social capital, which influences the trust for the j providers of information. By moving the ratio of prices to the left-hand side, we can differentiate with respect to personal capital or social capital. Consider the equation below, which examines the impact of a change in a consumer's personal capital for the two goods:
A change in personal capital seems likely to have differential impacts across the j information quality types and is not neutral on the marginal rate of substitution between genetically modifiedlabeled and plain-labeled food. To simplify the analysis and without loss of generality, assume a
, does not impact the marginal utility for plain-labeled (nongenetically modified) foods. Then equation (8) becomes
To further understand how social capital can change consumption behavior, consider the following example. Suppose environmental groups provide negative information about genetically modified food, and agribusiness companies provide positive information about genetically modified food. Suppose an increase in a consumer's education increases his or her trust in environmental groups while decreasing his or her trust in agribusiness companies, other things equal. The response is summarized in equation (9):
Consider the sign of the derivative. First, assume that the marginal utility of plain-labeled foods is positive. Second, the change in marginal utility of foods labeled as genetically modified is negative with respect to trust of environmental groups, because environmental groups provide negative information on foods labeled as genetically modified. Third, the change in the marginal utility of foods labeled as genetically modified is positive with respect to trust of agribusiness firms because agribusiness firms provide positive information on foods labeled as genetically modified. If an increase in personal capital causes a consumer to trust environmental information more and agribusiness information less, then equation (9) has a negative sign and the consumer would purchase more plain-labeled food products relative to their genetically modified-labeled counterparts.
For this case, an increase in personal capital causes the consumer's marginal rate of substitution between genetically modified-labeled and plain-labeled foods to decrease, and the consumer will purchase more plain-labeled foods (see figure 1) . The opposite result holds if a change in a consumer's personal capital causes him or her to trust environmental groups less and agribusiness firms more. A change in a consumer's social capital causes similar effects on the demand for foods labeled as genetically modified. This example illustrates that, when personal or social capital changes the trust in an interested party (by changing the perceived quality of the information), it can change the consumer's demand for genetically modified-labeled or plainlabeled food.
The Survey
The participants in our post-experiment survey were adult consumers over 18 years of age from two major Midwestern metropolitan areas that were chosen by a random digit dialing method (see Huffman et al., 2003) . Three-hundred-eighteen individuals participated in our project out of 1,673.contacted, which was a response rate of approximately 19 percent. Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of the survey participants (or respondents). The demographics of our sample do not perfectly match the U.S. census demographic characteristics for these regions, but they are similar and provide a sufficient representation to examine who consumers trust for information on genetically modified foods (see the Appendix for the demographic characteristics of the areas). Although our participants are slightly skewed toward women, Katsaras et al. (2001) show that women make up a disproportional share of grocery shoppers-83 percent of shoppers versus 52 percent in the U.S. Census of Population. We now briefly discuss some of the demographic characteristics of the participants, which are presented in Tables 2 and 3 .
Education is a form of personal capital. An individual's education not only affects his or her opportunity cost of his or her time, but also his or her ability to acquire and process information and to make decisions (Schultz ,1975; Huffman, 1977) . Six percent of the participants did not complete high school; about 19 percent of the participants completed high school but did not attend college. Almost 35 percent of the participants attended college but did not obtain a 4-year degree. About 20 percent of the participants received a 4-year college degree, and 19 percent completed at least some graduate work.
An individual's age is a proxy for years of experience as a decision-maker and also an indicator of length of expected remaining length of life. Accumulated experience as a decision maker is expected to affect trust in information sources in general. Also, as an individual ages he or she has fewer expected years over which to obtain benefits from acquired information.
Religious upbringing is a form of social capital. An individual's religious upbringing could affect every decision that he or she makes and could play a significant role in trust formation. Our survey asked people to indicate their religious affiliation when they were young.
Fifteen percent of the participants were raised as Baptists, slightly more than 26 percent of participants were raised as Catholics, over 17 percent of the participants were raised as Lutherans, and almost 16 percent were raised as Methodists (see table 2 ). Almost 20 percent indicated they were raised with some other specific religious upbringing and almost 6 percent indicated that they were not raised with any religious upbringing.
Individuals participating in our project were asked to bid on vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and Russet potatoes. After these bidding experiments were completed, they were then asked to complete a post-auction questionnaire containing the question: "If a source were to give you verifiable information on genetically modified foods, who would you trust most?" 2 This was an open-ended question, and participants wrote their answer down on the questionnaire. We then coded the responses into six categories: government; university, scientists/researchers, or thirdparty groups; environmental or consumer group; private industry or organization; none or nobody; and "other", including media.
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The first category is independent third-party sources. It contains responses from individuals who would most trust universities, scientists, or an independent third-party group that does not have financial ties to genetic modification. The second category, "government,"
contains responses from individuals who named a government (national, state, or local) or a governmental entity (e.g., the FDA). The third category "environmental or consumer group" is for participants who indicated they would most trust an environmental or consumer group to provide verifiable information on genetically modified foods. The fourth category is "private industry or organizations," which contains the response for any individual who listed a private entity or business as the group they would trust most. Most of these responses were for agribusiness firms or grocery stores. The fifth category is "none or no body" and it is for individuals who said they would not trust any source. The last category is classified as "other,"
and it contains responses by individuals who would trust the media, and some responses that were too sparse for their own category (e.g., one person said he or she most trusted God to provide verifiable information on genetically modified foods).
Excluding the "other" category, the most frequently reported trusted source for information on genetic modification the first group, "third-party including university, scientists/researches," accounting for 30 percent of the responses (see table 4 ). The "government" was listed by 20 percent of the respondents. The "environmental or consumer group," "private industry or organizations," and "none" each received less that 6 percent of the responses.
Econometric Model
Consider a random indirect utility model in which the utility of a consumer's choice j is determined by x j , consumer's household income, goods' prices, and attributes:
Here the utility of consumer i is based on choice j ∈ J. If he or she chooses j, it must be the choice that yields the highest utility to the individual. With disturbance terms that are independently and identically distributed Weibull, the probability of consumer i choosing choice j is:
Equation (11) 
We can represent the probability a consumer prefers one choice over another as the log-odds ratios:
Equation (14) shows the probability that a consumer prefers (trust) choice j over choice 0, the reference choice.
6 If β j ′ is positive, then a marginal increase in x i increases the odds that the consumer prefers choice j over the reference choice. For this study, the reference choice is the "independent third-party source." The regressors are variables proxying an individual's personal and social capital, his or her beliefs, and his or her household income.
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Econometric Results
The fitted model allows us to examine the odds that a consumer trusts one of the five sources of information more or less than he or she trusts an "independent third-party source" to provide verifiable information on genetically modified foods. Five regressors are included in this multinomial logit model: a participant's household income, education, age (which can be thought of as a proxy for experience), and a dummy variable for prior beliefs. This dummy variable equals one if the respondent perceives him-or herself as being "at least somewhat informed regarding genetically modified foods." These latter three variables are all types of personal capital. The fifth regressor is a participant's religious upbringing, represented by a dummy variable that equals one if the consumer was raised as a Baptist, a Catholic, or a Lutheran (the three strictest religious upbringings in the survey relative to the origin of life).
Religious upbringing is a form of social capital. An individual who is well educated is shown to more likely trust an "independent thirdparty" source relative to other sources. Increasing a participant's schooling lowers significantly the odds that he or she trusts government, private industry or organization, no body, and "other"
relative to a third-party source. Although the coefficient of education for the odds of environmental or consumer group is positive, it is not significantly different from zero.
As an individual becomes older, the odds he or she trusts an environmental or consumer group or "nobody" falls significantly relative to trusting third-party sources. His or her age, however, has a positive effect on the odds of trusting government, private industry or organization, or other relative to third-party information. These effects, however, are statistically weak. If a participant reported in the pre-auction questionnaire that he or she was "informed about genetically modified foods", he or she is significantly more likely to trust government relative to third-party source. If a participant had a strict religious upbringing, he or she has significantly lower odds of trusting private industry or organization and higher odds of trusting "no body" relative to a third-party source. The person's religious upbringing, however, did not have a significant effect on the odds of any of the other choices relative to third-party information.
8 Huffman and Tegene (2002) hypothesize that an independent third-party source of information on genetically modified foods would improve welfare, and Rousu et al. (2003) show that verifiable information on genetically modified foods could have an annual value to U.S.
Discussion
consumers of over $2 billion dollars. To be effective this type of information would have to be independent of interested parties-the international environmental NGOs and the agricultural biotechnology industry. The entity that creates this information may want to be at least partially independent of the government, because some individuals and groups are not in favor of current governmental, e.g., FDA, policies on voluntary food labels.
Of the individuals in our survey, approximately 30 percent said they would most trust information on genetically modified foods obtained from an independent third-party source, and if we exclude the "other" category, the share is 46 percent. A quasi-governmental entity funded by the government but not answering to the government may be the best possible source to provide information on foods labeled as genetically modified. Furthermore, given the large cost of performing and evaluating research to verify claims, the federal government is most likely the only source with sufficient resources to fund a public goods producing venture on the topic of genetic modification and agricultural biotechnology. 
Conclusion and Implications
Although many organizations disseminate information on a wide range of topics, they must gain the trust of a constituent group before they can affect decisions. In the case of GMfoods, the international environmental NGOs and agricultural biotech industry disseminate conflicting information. International environmental NGOs disseminate negative information;
agricultural biotech industry disseminates positive information. In fact, the international environmental NGOs, agricultural biotechnology industry, and U.S. government all have different interpretations of the role genetically modified foods should play in our society.
Although the literature on the economics of trust is growing rapidly, few studies have examined the contribution of an individual's personal and social capital to his or her trust. This paper has provided new econometric evidence that personal and social capital of adults who are consumers affect significantly their trust in five different sources of information on genetic modification relative to an independent, third-party source. We have shown that an individual's schooling, age, religion, and self-reporting status as being informed about genetically modified foods contributed significantly to explaining the odds of particular outcomes. Considering the ongoing, contentious debates over genetically modified foods and other products, our analysis makes a significant contribution by linking personal and social capital of consumers to their trust in information on genetically modified foods. Additional work remains to be done to explore important information quality issues associated with other new products and processes. 
